Morally Justifying Oncofertility Science by McLeod, Carolyn
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Philosophy Publications Philosophy Department
2010
Morally Justifying Oncofertility Science
Carolyn McLeod
Western University, cmcleod2@uwo.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/philosophypub
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Citation of this paper:
McLeod, Carolyn, "Morally Justifying Oncofertility Science" (2010). Philosophy Publications. 485.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/philosophypub/485
	 1	
Morally	Justifying	Oncofertility	Research	Carolyn	McLeod		
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Abstract:	Is	research	aimed	at	preserving	the	fertility	of	cancer	patients	morally	justified?	A	satisfying	answer	to	this	question	is	missing	from	the	literature	on	oncofertility.	Rather	than	provide	an	answer,	which	is	impossible	to	do	in	a	short	space,	this	paper	explains	what	it	would	take	to	provide	such	justification.							Is	research	aimed	at	preserving	the	fertility	of	cancer	patients	morally	justified?	In	response	to	this	question,	some	people	would	resoundingly	answer	“yes.”	Many	oncofertility	researchers	and	some	survivors	of	cancer	who	are	now	infertile	would	probably	react	this	way.	But	others	might	say	“no,”	in	particular	people	who	worry	about	the	just	distribution	of	scarce	resources,	the	risks	to	patients	and	to	their	potential	offspring	of	the	relevant	interventions	(Nisker	et	al	2006),	or	pronatalist	and	other	biases	that	seem	to	underlie	this	science.	While	I	lean	toward	“no”	myself,	I	recognize	that	the	issue	is	complicated.	I	also	believe	that	it	must	be	confronted.	Some	people	will	try	to	dodge	this	issue	by	presuming	that	oncofertility	research	is	justified,	on	the	grounds	that	it	promotes	a	basic	right	(to	reproduce)	or	resembles	research	that	our	society	has	already	condoned	(i.e.,	research	into	other	assisted	reproductive	technologies	(ART)).	But	actually,	there	is	no	getting	around	the	need	to	justify	this	research	and	to	do	so	on	moral	as	well	as	legal	grounds.	My	concern	specifically	is	with	its	moral	justification.		
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In	my	view,	a	sound	moral	justification	for	oncofertility	research	is	missing	from	the	literature	on	oncofertility.	Rather	than	fill	this	gap	myself—which	I	think	is	impossible	to	do	in	a	short	space	and	which	is	also	a	job	for	an	advocate,	not	a	skeptic,	of	the	science—my	goal	in	what	follows	is	to	explain	what	I	think	such	an	argument	must	look	like.			
Why	do	the	Research?		
Moral	justifications	for	oncofertility	research	often	refer,	understandably,	to	the	suffering	that	cancer	survivors	experience	if	they	are	infertile	because	of	their	cancer	treatments.	Reproductive	autonomy	is	relevant	here,	even	though	the	focus	is	on	suffering,	not	autonomy.	The	idea	is	that	the	potential	for	future	suffering	justifies	giving	cancer	survivors	the	choice	of	whether	to	preserve	their	fertility	and	use	the	preserved	gametes	or	tissue	in	the	future	to	attempt	to	have	their	own	genetically-related	children.	I	will	give	a	representative	example	of	such	an	argument,	analyze	it,	and	explain	why	it	and	arguments	like	it	are	flawed.1		
																																																								1	I	do	not	look	at	reproductive	rights	arguments	in	favour	of	oncofertility	research.	I	know	of	one	such	argument:	that	of	Leilah	Backhus	and	Laurie	Zoloth	in	the	last	oncofertility	volume	(2007).	According	to	Backhus	and	Zoloth,	oncofertility	research	will	protect	people’s	right	to	reproduce,	which	they	describe	as	an	“important	freedom	within	society	that	is	seldom	questioned	or	restricted”	(166).	They	give	a	significant	amount	of	weight	to	this	freedom,	which	they	justify	by	appealing	to	the	work	of	John	Robertson	(1994),	but	also	by	claiming	that	infertility	is	a	disease	or	disability	that	people	ought	to	have	the	freedom	to	overcome.	I	am	doubtful	that	Backhus	and	Zoloth	do	enough	to	show	that	a	right	to	reproduce	justifies	this	research	(especially	if	the	right	is	negative,	which	is	how	a	right	to	reproduce	is	normally	understood,	and	if	the	science	is	publicly	funded).	But	I	do	not	engage	with	their	argument	here	and	thus	do	not	show	definitively	that	compelling	arguments	in	favour	of	oncofertility	science	are	absent	from	the	literature.			
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The	representative	example	comes	from	Philip	Rosoff	and	Melanie	Katsur	(2003).	The	following	is	the	positive	argument	they	give	for	pursuing	oncofertility	research2:	
P1)	A	common	complication	of	cancer	treatment	is	infertility.	
P2)	Infertility	“can	be	[and	often	is]	a	devastating	experience,	especially	for	women”	(3).		
P3)	Available	data	on	cancer	survivors	and	the	clinical	experience	of	one	author	suggest	that	cancer	survivors	are	no	different	than	the	rest	of	us:	many	want	genetically-related	children3	and	infertility	is	or	can	be	devastating	for	many	of	them,	especially	the	women.				
P4)	Genetic	parenting	is	“one	of	life’s	greatest	fulfillments”	(4).	
C)	Thus,	providing	cancer	patients,	especially	female	patients,	with	the	chance	of	preserving	their	fertility	is	worthwhile,	and	this	in	itself	justifies	the	research.		
The	overall	concern	here	is	with	the	happiness	or	life	satisfaction	of	cancer	survivors.	The	thought	is	that	having	genetic	children	will	add	significantly,	and	may																																																									2	I	have	omitted	their	responses	to	reasons	others	might	give	for	not	doing	this	research:	e.g.,	that	patients	could	not	meaningfully	consent	to	it	or	that	potential	harms	to	offspring	would	be	too	great	(16).		
3	Rosoff	and	Katsur	use	the	expression	“biological	children”	but	I	prefer	instead	“genetically-related”	or	“genetic	children.”	In	my	view,	the	category	of	biologic	children	is	larger	than	that	of	genetic	children.	Children	to	whom	women	give	birth	but	to	which	they	are	not	genetically	related	are	still	the	women’s	biologic	children	because	of	a	biological	tie	created	during	pregnancy.	Fertility	preservation	can	allow	oncofertility	patients	to	have	genetic	children,	but	may	not	be	necessary	for	them	(particularly	for	the	female	patients)	to	have	biologic	children.		
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in	fact	be	essential,	to	their	well	being.	I	take	it	that	if	asked	whether	oncofertility	research	is	justified,	many	people	would	give	a	response	similar	to	Rosoff’s	and	Katsur’s.	But	is	their	argument	compelling?	We	should	ask	two	things	about	it:	first,	are	its	premises	all	true?	Second,	does	its	conclusion	follow	logically	from	its	premises?	Beginning	with	the	first	question,	I	assume	that	we	can	accept	P1,	but	what	about	P2-P4?	What	evidence	do	Rosoff	and	Katsur	provide	for	their	truth	and	is	that	evidence	sufficient?		
The	first	of	these	premises,	P2,	has	to	do	with	how	infertility	impacts	on	people’s	lives.	Many	of	us	believe	that	infertility	is	or	at	least	can	be	devastating,	especially	for	women.	Our	grounds	for	this	belief	may	be	that	people	in	general,	but	women	in	particular,	have	strong	reproductive	instincts	that	when	thwarted	cause	them	great	suffering.	Rosoff	and	Katsur	make	such	a	claim,	and	also	bolster	their	argument	with	an	appeal	to	psychological	literature	about	the	psychological	distress	that	often	accompanies	infertility.			
	Let	me	comment	first	on	the	appeal	to	reproductive	instinct.	Insofar	as	we	have	such	a	drive,	is	it	“rooted	in	biology”	or	in	social	conditioning	(Pearson	2007,	109)?	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	answer	seems	to	be	“both”	(2).	But	of	course	it	is	hard	to	know	whether	or	how	much	biology	plays	a	role	here,	because	society	weighs	in	so	heavily	in	favour	of	many	of	us	having	biologic	children	(Bartholet	1993,	24).4	Social	influences	alone	could	explain	why	many	people	yearn	for	biologic	children,	why	many	view	adoption	as	a	last	resort,	and	why	many	regard	childlessness	as	a	fate																																																									4	Our	society	does	not	strongly	encourage	reproduction	for	everyone;	it	is	anti-natalist	toward	certain	groups,	such	as	poor	Black	women	(Roberts	1997).	
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almost	worse	than	death.	Rosoff	and	Katsur	suggest	that	the	eventual	frustration	of	a	strong	urge	to	procreate	warrants	a	medical	response:	that	of	fertility	preservation.	Many	people	would	oppose	this	move	however	if	the	procreative	desire	were	entirely	the	product	of	socialization,	although	the	move	is	questionable	even	with	desires	that	are	purely	biological.	One	cannot	justify	a	medical	intervention	simply	by	showing	that	it	would	prevent	a	strong	desire	from	being	frustrated,	regardless	of	the	origins	of	the	desire	and	regardless	of	whether	the	person	would	be	devastated	if	the	desire	were	not	satisfied.	For	example,	risky	and	invasive	cosmetic	surgeries	may	not	be	justified	even	if	women	desire	them	intensely	because	they	have	been	socialized	to	find	their	aging	bodies	disgusting.	The	same	is	true	of	extraordinary	measures	to	keep	dying	children	alive	for	which	parents	beg	because	of	a	powerful	instinct	to	want	their	children	alive.	In	short,	claims	about	instinct	may	not	show	very	much.		
Nevertheless,	that	infertility	prevents	the	satisfaction	of	a	strong	desire	and	thereby	causes	feelings	of	devastation,	could	contribute	to	the	justification	of	fertility	preservation.	But	do	we	know	that	infertility	has	this	effect?	What	proof	do	Rosoff	and	Katsur	provide	for	such	a	claim?	As	I	mentioned,	they	appeal	to	relevant	work	in	psychology	to	try	to	substantiate	P2.	In	particular,	they	refer	favorably	to	an	oft-cited	paper	by	Arthur	Greil,	which	critically	reviews	the	literature	on	“infertility	and	psychological	distress”	(1997).	However,	among	Greil’s	critical	remarks	about	this	literature	is	the	observation	that	it	focuses	almost	exclusively	on	those	who	seek	treatment	for	their	infertility.	These	people	represent	less	than	half	of	all	infertile	people	in	the	United	States,	according	to	statistics	gathered	in	1995	
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(Harwood	2007,	13).	Many	of	the	psychological	studies	on	which	Greil	comments	focus	even	more	narrowly	on	people	who	pursue	IVF	“and	other	‘high-tech’	treatment	options,”	people	who	are	predominantly	“white,	middle-class	urbanites”	(Greil	1699)	and	who	make	up	only	2	percent	of	all	treatment	seekers	(Harwood	13).	Consequently,	the	most	we	can	conclude	from	the	literature	that	Rosoff	and	Katsur	cite	is	that	infertility	can	be	devastating	(for	women	in	particular).	Such	a	weak	claim	will	not	get	us	very	far,	however,	in	showing	that	oncofertility	research	is	morally	worthwhile.	One	would	be	hard	pressed	to	justify	the	expense	knowing	that	the	research	may	only	benefit	a	small	number	of	people.		
A	further	criticism	Greil	makes	of	studies	about	the	psychological	impact	of	infertility	is	that	they	have	poor	sample	sizes.	Unfortunately,	this	same	criticism	applies	to	studies	about	the	desire	of	cancer	survivors	to	reproduce.	Rosoff	and	Katsur	supply	the	latter	studies	as	evidence	in	favour	of	P3,	which	concerns	the	extent	to	which	cancer	survivors	want	to	procreate.	For	example,	they	cite	a	paper	by	Leslie	Schover	and	colleagues	that	describes	a	survey	of	cancer	survivor’s	attitudes	on	the	subject	(1999).	These	researchers	conclude	that	76%	of	the	respondents	who	were	“childless”	wanted	to	reproduce	(and	by	“childless”	they	surprisingly	mean	without	biologic	children5);	but	there	were	only	71	of	these	people,	and	only	132	respondents	in	total.	Hence,	while	interesting	perhaps,	such	
																																																								5	Table	4	in	their	paper	puts	the	total	number	“currently	childless”	at	71	(702),	but	their	discussion	reveals	that	ten	of	these	people	had	stepchildren	and	two	had	adopted	a	child	(701).	To	suggest	that	these	twelve	people	are	childless,	and	are	therefore	not	parents,	is	false	and	potentially	very	offensive	to	them	and	their	children.		
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studies	cannot	substantiate	P3,	for	which	Rosoff	and	Katsur	do	not	provide	sufficient	evidence.6		
The	last	premise	to	consider	is	P4,	which	says	that	genetic	parenting	is	one	of	life’s	greatest	fulfillments.	People	often	make	such	a	claim	about	parenting	in	general;	yet	for	P4	to	make	sense	in	the	context	of	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	argument,	it	must	be	specific	to	genetic	parenting.	(Rosoff	and	Katsur	do	not	state	the	claim	very	clearly	and	like	Schover	et	al,	sometimes	forget	that	not	all	parenting	is	genetic	or	biological.)	P4	is	designed	to	show	that	cancer	survivors	have	good	reason	to	want	to	procreate	or	good	reason	to	be	devastated	if	they	cannot	procreate.	In	other	words,	P4	suggests	that	the	desire	mentioned	in	P3	(and	also	alluded	to	in	P2)	is	worthwhile,	objectively	speaking.	
Interestingly,	Rosoff	and	Katsur	provide	no	evidence	for	P4,	which	suggests	that	they	believe	its	truth	is	self-evident.	But	is	it	obvious	that	biologic	parenting	contributes	to	a	good	life?	The	answer	must	be	“no”	if	studies	in	psychology	about	well	being	and	parenting	are	to	be	taken	seriously.	These	studies	show	consistent	evidence	of	“an	almost	zero	association	between	having	children	and	happiness”	or	well	being	(Powdthavee	2009,	308).	In	other	words,	they	reveal	that	P4	could,	quite	simply,	be	false.	Since	I	doubt	many	readers	will	accept	that	about	P4,	let	me	direct	our	attention	to	an	absolute	version	of	this	premise:	genetic	parenting	is	always	
																																																								6	They	also	appeal	to	an	article	written	by	Schover	alone,	which	reviews	the	“psychosocial	aspects	of	infertility	and	decisions	about	reproduction	in	young	cancer	survivors”	(1999).	This	article	simply	hypothesizes,	however,	rather	than	shows,	that	infertility	is	distressing	for	cancer	survivors.	Overall,	in	the	oncofertility	literature,	there	appears	to	be	much	speculation,	and	little	hard	data,	about	how	cancer	survivors	feel	about	procreating	(see	also	Snyder	2007).	
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fulfilling.	Such	a	statement	is	surely	false.	And	so	perhaps	the	claim	should	be	that	genetic	parenting	is	fulfilling	other	things	being	equal:	that	is,	only	when	certain	conditions	are	present	or	others	are	absent.	The	question	then	becomes,	however,	what	are	the	relevant	conditions?	Could	one	of	them	be	the	absence	of	a	history	of	cancer?	While	this	may	sound	odd	or	insensitive,	consider	that	after	“battling	pediatric	cancer,	many	survivors	endure	numerous	difficulties	throughout	their	lives	despite	being	cured	of	their	disease.	Fertility	deficits	are	only	one	of	the	problems	that	they	face	…”	(Kinahan	et	al	2007,	198).	Could	it	not	be	that	parenting	would	simply	add	to	the	burdens	of	some	(or	many)	cancer	survivors?		
My	point	is	not	that	P4	is	false,	but	rather	that	evidence	needs	to	be	marshaled	in	favour	of	it	or	any	other	controversial	premise	in	an	argument	that	defends	oncofertility	research.	Moreover,	the	evidence	needs	to	be	substantial,	especially	given	how	many	resources	are	required	for	this	research	to	happen.	Proponents	of	the	science	cannot	simply	assume	that	most	people	have	a	strong	procreative	instinct,	that	cancer	survivors	are	among	these	people,	that	procreation	invariably	contributes	to	a	fulfilling	life,	and	that	therefore	infertility	is	devastating	for	cancer	survivors,	even	though	they	may	be	able	to	have	children	in	other	ways:	that	is,	through	adoption	or	the	assistance	of	a	gamete	donor.		
To	be	clear,	the	goal	of	oncofertility	specialists	is	to	preserve	the	capacity	of	cancer	patients	to	become	genetic	parents,	not	to	become	parents	of	any	kind.	Granted,	cancer	survivors	may	confront	barriers	to	becoming	non-genetic	parents.	For	example,	they	may	face	discrimination,	de	facto	or	otherwise,	when	attempting	
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to	adopt	children	(see	Gardino,	this	volume).	But	why	then	not	work	to	remove	these	barriers—more	specifically	to	adoption—rather	than	to	preserve	the	fertility	of	cancer	patients?	Perhaps	we	ought	to	do	both,	which	is	something	that	some	members	of	the	Oncofertility	Consortium	accept,	despite	their	focus	on	fertility	preservation.	Why	both,	however,	rather	than	just	the	one	that	allows	for	non-biologic	parenthood	(i.e.,	adoption)?	To	offset	the	bias	that	our	society	has	toward	biologic	parenting	(Bartholet	1993;	Haslanger	forthcoming),	perhaps	we	ought	to	promote	non-biologic	parenting	for	infertile	cancer	survivors,	for	infertile	people	in	general,	or	for	everyone	for	that	matter.	
This	discussion	of	different	forms	of	parenthood	is	relevant	in	assessing	whether	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	argument	is	valid.	I	have	shown	that	they	have	not	established	the	truth	of	their	premises.	Yet	even	if	they	had,	one	might	ask	whether	we	should	accept	their	conclusion,	(C),	on	the	basis	of	the	premises	they	give.	Does	the	truth	of	their	premises	guarantee	the	truth	of	their	conclusion?	In	other	words,	is	their	argument	valid?	I	do	not	think	that	it	is,	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	assuming	that	resources	are	scarce,	oncofertility	research	can	only	be	justified	if	there	are	not	other	more	worthwhile	ways	of	allocating	the	resources	that	support	it.	But	it	is	far	from	obvious	that	this	is	the	case,	especially	given	that	the	research	may	not	be	as	worthwhile	as	Rosoff	and	Katsur	suggest.	Notice	that	the	devastation	some	cancer	survivors	feel	upon	discovering	that	they	are	infertile	could	potentially	be	overcome	through	non-biologic	parenting.	There	are	psychological	studies	indicating	that	among	infertile	people	who	do	fertility	treatments	that	are	unsuccessful,	those	who	choose	to	adopt	children	have	a	greater	degree	of	life	
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satisfaction	than	those	who	do	not	(Peddie	et	al	2005,	Bryson	et	al	2000).7	These	adoptive	parents	(and	I	hope	soon	to	be	one	of	them)	could	easily	have	levels	of	well	being	similar	to	those	of	infertile	people	who	succeed	with	fertility	treatments.8		Indeed,	their	experience	may	reveal	that	adoptive	parenting	is	“one	of	life’s	greatest	fulfillments.”	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	argument	is	not	valid	because	it	ignores	this	possibility	and	the	implications	it	has	for	the	just	allocation	of	resources	that	are	now	being	spent	on	oncofertility.			
Second,	Rosoff	and	Katsur	want	to	say	that	the	research	should	proceed	with	its	mandate	of	preserving	the	fertility	of	cancer	patients.	However,	what	about	women	who	want	to	reproduce	but	need	to	delay	childbearing	beyond	the	time	at	which	they	are	most	likely	to	be	able	to	conceive	a	child	without	assistance?	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	argument	does	not	justify	the	scientists’	focus	on	the	first	group	of	women	rather	than	the	second	(i.e.,	on	fertility	preservation	for	disease-related	infertility	rather	than	age-related	infertility;	see	Petropanagos,	this	volume).	If	we	can	construct	versions	of	P1-P4	that	apply	to	women	who	will	likely	suffer	from	age-related	infertility,	then	presumably	we	cannot	accept	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	conclusion	that	oncofertility	research	ought	to	proceed.	Consider	the	following:				
																																																								7	As	with	the	studies	about	the	desire	of	cancer	survivors	to	procreate,	the	sample	sizes	with	these	studies	are	low.	But	notice	I	use	them	to	show	only	that	a	certain	possibility	exists,	not	that	certain	claims	are	true.		
8	Some	will	say	that	these	people	would	not	have	achieved	such	levels	of	well	being	if	they	had	not	had	the	opportunity	to	resolve	their	infertility	by	undergoing	infertility	treatment.	While	it	may	however	be	true	that	(unsuccessful)	treatment	can	help	with	resolving	infertility,	surely	a	resolution	can	come	about	in	other	ways.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	it	is	a	myth	that	infertile	people	need	to	go	through	infertility	treatment	if	only	to	resolve	their	infertility	(see	Harwood	2007).		
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P1)	A	common	complication	of	being	a	career-aspiring	woman	is	infertility.	
P2)	Infertility	“can	be	[and	often	is]	a	devastating	experience,	especially	for	women.”		
P3)	Available	data	on	career-aspiring	women	suggest	that	they	are	no	different	than	the	rest	of	us:	many	want	genetically-related	children	and	infertility	is	or	can	be	devastating	for	many	of	them.			
P4)	Genetic	parenting	is	“one	of	life’s	greatest	fulfillments.”	
C)	Thus,	providing	career-aspiring	women	with	the	possibility	of	preserving	their	fertility	is	worthwhile,	and	this	in	itself	justifies	research	on	fertility	preservation.		
Without	a	premise	stating	that	we	do	not	owe	the	same	consideration	to	career-aspiring	women	that	we	do	to	female	cancer	patients,	Rosoff	and	Katsur’s	argument	in	favour	of	oncofertility	research	is	invalid.		
Conclusion	
To	be	sound,	an	argument	in	favour	of	oncofertility	research	must	justify	preserving	the	fertility	of	cancer	patients	specifically,	despite	the	possibility	of	them	becoming	non-genetic	parents,	and	despite	the	exorbitant	cost	of	the	research.	Genetic	parenthood	may	be	essential	to	the	well	being	of	many	cancer	survivors.	Each	survivor	may	even	have	a	right	to	become	a	genetic	parent	(one	that	entitles	him	or	
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her	to	have	scientists	develop	oncofertility	techniques	using	public	funds).	But	neither	of	these	claims	is	obvious,	and	each	needs	to	be	defended	rigorously.			
Obviously,	the	sort	of	justification	I	believe	is	needed	for	oncofertility	research	does	not	presume	that	genetic	parenthood	is	superior	to	other	forms	of	parenthood.	Such	justification	has	rarely,	if	ever,	been	given	for	the	development	of	other	ART,	such	as	in	vitro	fertilization.	But	this	is	no	reason	not	to	provide	it	for	oncofertility	research.	Until	that	happens,	the	science	will	be	on	shaky	moral	ground.		
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